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Abstract:  Internet of things (IoT) is an emerging paradigm 
where the devices around us (persistent and non-persistent) are 
connected to each other to provide seamless communication, and 
contextual services.  In the IoT, each device cannot be authenticated 
in the short time due to unbounded number of devices, and receipt of 
their authentication request at the same time. Therefore, secure, and 
efficient group authentication, and authorization scheme is required 
that authenticates a group of devices at once in the context of 
resource constrained IoT. This paper presents novel Threshold 
Cryptography-based Group Authentication (TCGA) scheme for the 
IoT which verifies authenticity of all the devices taking part in the 
group communication. This paper also presents TCGA framework 
which is flexible and secure. The proposed TCGA scheme is 
implemented for WI-FI environment, and the result shows that 
TCGA scheme is lightweight, and alleviates the effect of battery 
exhaustion attack. This paper also presents time analysis, and formal 
security analysis of TCGA scheme which shows that the proposed 
TCGA scheme is safe from the replay, man-in-the-middle attack, and 
is scalable in nature.  
 
Keywords: Authentication, Internet of Things, Threshold 
Cryptography. 
 
I. Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the network 
interconnection of everyday devices. An IoT is a world-wide 
network of inter-connected devices uniquely addressable, 
based on a standard communication protocol. In the IoT, 
people are surrounded by different types of computing devices 
which are billion in number, varied in size, and capabilities to 
communicate with each other. Devices are having limited 
capabilities, and computing resources which range from Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags to embedded devices, 
PDA, and sensor nodes. IoT integrates the physical world with 
the information world, and provides ambient services, and 
applications. IoT networks allow users, devices, and 
applications in different physical locations to communicate 
seamlessly with one another. In brief, the IoT facilitates 
different communication patterns like: user-to-user, user-to-
device, device-to-device, and devices-to-user. However, the 
decentralized, and distributed nature of the IoT face challenges 
in authentication, access control, and Identity Management 
(IdM) [2, 3, and 4]. There are various challenges to design 
security solutions in the IoT like constraints, and 
heterogeneous communication, resource constraints, and 
distributed nature.  
 
IdM of devices in the IoT is one of the important 
challenges, and can be achieved by efficient authentication 
schemes which are simple, secure, and lightweight. In the IoT, 
there are unbounded numbers of heterogeneous devices 
talking to each other. Each device should not be able to 
authenticate during the short time. Due to the scale of 
economics, more than hundreds of devices may request 
authentication approval at the same time. To this purpose, 
lightweight, scalable, and secure group authentication scheme 
is required which will authenticate groups of devices, and not 
the individual devices to achieve secure group 
communication. This paper proposes a group authentication 
scheme using Paillier Threshold Cryptography [5, 6, and 7] 
which is a public key variant of the (t, n) threshold scheme 
where t is threshold, and n is number of group members. The 
Paillier Cryptosystem helps to achieve homomorphic 
properties, which is most suited for privacy preservation in the 
IoT applications. It is probabilistic asymmetric public key 
encryption system which uses randomness in an encryption 
algorithm, so that when encrypting the same, plaintext for 
several times. This will yield different cipher texts. The key 
properties of Paillier Cryptosystem include homomorphic 
addition, indistinguishability, and self-binding [5, 8]. 
Essentially, the Paillier Cryptosystem comprises of three 
algorithms: key generation, encryption and decryption.  The 
proposed TCGA scheme is used to verify the authenticity of 
all the members taking part in a group oriented application. 
The scheme also helps in establishing a shared secret key 
between the members of the group which can be used for 
further communication in any group oriented applications.   
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents 
related works, and evaluation of the related works. Section III 
presents the proposed TCGA scheme and TCGA framework. 
Section IV presents the implementation results, security 
analysis, and the discussion. Finally, section V summarizes the 
paper with the future work. 
 
II. Related Works 
In a group authentication [9], participants belonging to the 
same group are authenticated. It is many-to-many type of 
authentication, which is more suited for group oriented IoT 
applications as there are more number of devices. Group 
authentication for users is presented in [9], which is t-secure, 
m-user, n-group Group Authentication Scheme (GAS): ((t, m, 
n) GAS), where t is a threshold of the proposed scheme. In [9], 
resources, constrained devices are not considered. Scalable, 
and decentralized group authentication protocol for vehicular 
communication is presented in [10].  Detail security analysis 
of the proposed scheme is not presented in [10]. Group-based 
handover authentication scheme for mobile WiMAX networks 
is presented in [11], where handover of security context takes 
place at the each mobility. It consists of point multiplication 
operation at each node which adds extra overheads. Secure 
mutual authentication protocol for RFID is presented in [12]. 
Hash-based encryption adds more overhead to this scheme. In 
[13], the profile based authentication, and authorization is 
 
discussed without implementation details, and results. A 
group-based negotiation in peer to peer system is presented in 
[14], but authors have failed to discuss the security analysis of 
the proposed scheme. Resource negotiation language is 
discussed in the scope of this paper but, its applicability to 
other ad-hoc networks is left unaddressed. A lightweight, and 
distributed group authentication scheme for ad-hoc network 
devices is presented in [15]. Performance analysis of the 
proposed scheme is not discussed in [15].  
 
From the state of the art, it must be however noted that 
existing group authentication schemes are not lightweight, and 
secure. Also in the context of IoT, there is a need of scalable 
group authentication scheme due to large number of 
heterogeneous devices.  
 
III. Proposed TCGA Scheme 
In [9], the author has achieved group authentication by 
releasing token based on Shamir’s (t, n) secret sharing scheme. 
This paper extends this work using Paillier Threshold 
Cryptography.  Proposed TCGA scheme also establishes a 
secret session key at the end of each group authentication 
which can be used for group application. TCGA scheme is 
implemented in WI-FI environment.   
 
 
Figure 1: Group Authentication 
 
Initially, let’s consider an environment where we have 
devices in two contexts as shown in above Part I of the Figure 
1. Each group contains a set of devices communicating with 
each other using shared secret key. There can be any number 
of groups each having its specified range of connectivity 
according to the WI-FI standard. These groups can even 
overlap with each other with many devices capable of being a 
part of more than one group. Part II in the Figure 1 depicts the 
state of the environment when a member has group 
authenticated with a group. Now, if a device of the group B, 
wants to communicate with any device in the group A, then 
device will initiate the handshake, thereby authenticating itself 
with the  group A. Eventually, only authenticated devices from 
the group B will have the secret of the group A. Now it can 
communicate with all the members of the group A since it is 
group authenticated. On the other hand, all the devices of the 
group B except the authenticated one cannot communicate 
with the group A devices. The head of the group is required to 
generate, and distribute the new key pairs every time a new 
member enters the group to maintain group key leakage, and it 
is referred as Group Authority (GA) in this paper. TCGA 
comprises following five modules: 
 
1. Key Distribution. 
2. Key Updation. 
3. Group Credits Generation. 
4. Authentication Listener. 
5. Message Decryptor. 
 
Algorithms for these five modules are presented below. 
Time analysis of key distribution shows that it takes O (n) 
time for ‘n’ devices which is linear time, and, hence efficient 
for large number of devices. Time analysis of group 
authentication is polynomial time with O (n
2
) which is fairly 
good time for group oriented applications in IoT.  
 
Algorithm 1 TCGA – Key Distribution 
1: GA <-- Key Distributor 
2: NewM <-- New Member 
3: Gcurr <-- The Group member wants to join 
4: START 
5:     if (REQUEST == JOIN) 
6:     if (groupListContains(Gcurr) &&  
        Pssword= = Gcurr.Password) 
7:     updateMemberList(IP[NewM]) 
8:     updateThreshold(n) 
9:     keys [] = KeyGen. PaillierThresholdKey (128, n, threshold,    
10:   randomNum( )) 
11:   for (k: Gcurr.groupMembers ) 
12:   Connect (Gcurr.groupMembers.i) 
13:   Send (Gcurr, key [k++]) 
14:     else 
15:         Display ("ERROR") 
16: END 
 
Time Analysis: n = Number of devices  
 
Recurrence relation can be written as:  
T (n) = T (n-1) + T (1)   
              = T (n-2) + 2*T (1) 
              = T (n-3) + 3*T (1) 
              ... 
              = T (n-k) + k*T (1), let’s put k = n-1 
         T (n) = T (1) + n-1(T (1)) 
         T (n) = 2 + n*2 – 2 
  Hence T (n) = O (n)   
 
Time analysis of key distribution shows that, in the 
proposed TCGA scheme, it takes O (n) time to distribute key 
amongst n devices. This shows that, even for large number of 
devices, the time required for key distribution is linear and 
more appropriate for the scalable IoT.   
 
Algorithm 2 TCGA – Key Updation 
1: Gcurr <-- Current Group 
2: START 
3:     if (REQUEST == "UPDATE_KEY") 
4:     Update (Gcurr.set(PrivatePartKey) ,  
        Gcurr.set (GroupMemberList)) 
5: END 
 
Algorithm 3 TCGA – Group Credits Generation 
1: Gcurr <-- Current Group 
2: START 
3:      secret = Random (r) 
4       hash = MessageDigest ["SHA-512", secret] 
5:      GroupCred = Encrpyt ([secret, hash]_KPublicKey ) 
 
6:      for (i: Gcurr.groupMembers) 
7:      Send (GroupCred,i ) 
8:      //After Group Cred sent to all the members,  
         GAuthentication starts 
9:      for (i: Gcurr.groupMembers) 
         Send (“Start Distribution”) 
10: END 
 
Algorithm 4 TCGA – Authentication Listener 
1: GroupCred <- [Secret, H (Secret)] 
2: Gcurr <-- Current Group 
3: PDM <-- Partially Decrypted Message 
4: START 
5:       if (REQUEST == "START DISTRIBUTION") 
6:       myPDM = DECRYPT (GroupCred, Gcurr.  
          PrivatePartKey) 
7:       START [ PDMMessageDecryptor ] 
8:       for (i: Gcurr. GroupMembers) 
9:       Send (myPDM)  
10: END 
 
Algorithm 5 TCGA – Message Decryptor 
1: Gcurr <-- Current Group 
2: PDM   <-- Partial Decrypted Message 
3: START 
4:       while ( Gcurr.groupMembers - 1 ) 
5:       PartialDecryption [k++] = Received [PDM] 
6:       if (finalDECRYPTION = CombineShares (  
          PartialDecryption [])) 
7:       GROUP AUTHENTICATION SUCCESSFUL 
8:        else 
9:        GROUP AUTHENTICATION UNSUCCESSFULL 
10: END 
 
Time Analysis: Group Authentication  
 
Recurrence relation can be written as: 
 
              T (n) = T (n-1) + O (n)   
              = T (n-2) + O (n-1)) + O (n) 
              = T (n-2) + O (n-1) + O (n) 
              = T (n-3) + O (n-2) + O (n-1) + O (n) 
                 ... 
              = T (1) + O (2) + ... + O (n-1) + O (n) 
              = O (1 + 2 + ... + n-1 + n) 
              = O (n
2
) 
 
Time analysis of the proposed TCGA scheme shows that, 
to authenticate n devices to each other from different group, it 
takes O (n
2
) time. O (n
2
) represents polynomial time 
complexity and for even large number of devices, it performs 
better. This time is also logarithmic time as the running time 
of this algorithm is proportional to the square of input size. To 
summarize, detailed time analysis of the proposed TCGA 
scheme shows that it is time efficient and, most suited for the 
IoT consisting of unbounded number of devices. 
 
TCGA scheme uses a variant of the public-key 
cryptography known as Threshold Cryptography to develop a 
lightweight group authentication mechanism suitable for ad-
hoc devices. Group authentication aims at removing the need 
to establish a secure connection between all the devices in a 
particular group every time they want to communicate, and 
thereby reducing the number of handshakes done before the 
communication starts. This reduced overhead will help in 
conserving battery power as well as ensures that minimum 
numbers of resources are used. This provision of joining new 
member to the group, and updating threshold value for new 
device, and generating key using Threshold Cryptography is 
the task of key distribution module. Key Updation module 
generates public/ private key pairs for GA. The other members 
of the group change their private part keys using this module. 
The Message Decryptor module combines all the partially 
decrypted messages, and produces final a decrypted message. 
The Authentication Listener module listens for authentication 
request if any, and accepts the Partially Decrypted Message 
(PDM) from all the members.  TCGA works in two phases: 
 
Figure 2: TCGA Activity Diagram 
 
Complete TCGA scheme is depicted in the Figure 2 with 
an activity diagram which describes the logical processes, or 
functions where each process describes a sequence of tasks, 
and decisions that govern when, and how they are performed. 
 
a. Pre-Authentication Phase 
 
In this phase, the GA of the group, who creates the group, 
is responsible for generating a public key KPu (G) and multiple 
private keys KPr1 (G)…..KPrn (G) using Paillier Threshold 
Cryptosystem depending upon the number of members (n) in 
the group, and the threshold value t. Private keys K Pr1(G)…..K 
Prn(G) are then distributed by the GA among all the members of 
the group. When a new member joins the group, the threshold 
value is changed appropriately, and keys are generated, and 
distributed again. This threshold value changes dynamically as 
new members join so that the high level of security is 
maintained. 
 
b. Group Authentication Phase  
 
If a group activity needs to be started, group authentication 
needs to be performed as a pre-requisite to check if all the 
members M1…Mm (where m<=n) are part of the group. The 
GA chooses a pseudo-random number as a session secret [SS] 
key which is going to be shared with all the members of the 
group once the group authentication is done. This is encrypted 
using the public key [KPu] of the group, and sent to all the 
members of the group. The hash of the session secret H [SS] is 
also sent along with it. 
Message = {[SS] KPu, H [SS]} 
Each of the members, upon reception of this message, 
applies their private key part to decrypt it, giving them a PDM. 
Each device has a unique PDM corresponding to a different 
part key.  
 
PDM = Decrypt (Message, PrivatePartKey) 
Each device then sends this PDM to every member 
including the GA. All the devices wait to combine all the 
PDMs until n-1 PDMs are received. Each device combines all 
the PDMs so as to get the decrypted session key.  
 
Session Key = Combine (PDM1, PDM2… PDMm) 
 
If combining all PDM shares is successful, the session key 
is obtained and it proves that all the members are a part of that 
group only. The Decrypted session key is hashed to get H’ 
[SS] and checked with the one sent by the GA. If H’ [SS] = H 
[SS], then authentication is successful, and session key [SS] is 
obtained. This comparison is made to check whether the 
session key obtained is valid. The session key [SS] obtained in 
the last step can be used for further communication between 
the devices which can be carried out using Symmetric Key 
Encryption. If combining all PDM shares is unsuccessful 
means that there is at least one non-member in the group, and, 
hence the activity cannot be initiated, and group authentication 
fails. Further individual authentication needs to be done to 
identify the non-member in the group. 
 
To summarize, when any particular member wants to start 
a group activity, it send a request to the current GA. On 
reception of the request, the GA generates a session secret 
which is going to be shared by all the members of that group. 
This session secret is then encrypted with the public key of the 
group. This provides the required security as it can only be 
decrypted by the complete private key. A Hash map function 
is applied to the session secret which is going to be used in 
further steps to prove the integrity of this message. It is sent 
along with the encrypted session secret in a single message.  
This message is sent to all the members of the group. All the 
devices then use their own part private keys to decrypt this 
message which gives them a PDM which is not the final 
session secret. Now it sends this PDM to each member in the 
group. Until n-1 PDMs are received each of the devices waits. 
All the devices then try to combine all of the shares which will 
ultimately give them the final session secret. If successful, 
means that all the PDMs received are by the legitimate group 
members only, and, hence the group authentication succeeds. 
The group activity can then be started using the session secret 
for further communication. If unsuccessful, means that there is 
at least one device which is using a fake part private key and 
hence the partial decryption generated by him is not genuine. 
Therefore, upon trying to combine all the shares it was result 
in failure. This means that group authentication fails, and there 
is a need to restart the process. 
 
 
Figure 3: Proposed TCGA Framework 
 
• Proposed TCGA Framework 
 
In the IoT communication, there are devices belonging to 
same group or different group communicating to each other in 
distributed manner. When devices of the same group 
communicate with each other, there is some amount of trust 
available between them. But when the devices of the different 
group communicate to each other, proposed TCGA scheme is 
required. Proposed TCGA framework is presented in the 
Figure 3. Framework depicts the major components of 
authentication process. In the IoT applications like banking, 
utilities, agriculture and healthcare, authentication is a major 
 
concern. When the devices belonging to different groups 
communicate to each other through Internet, TCGA performs 
key distribution, key updation, message decryption and finally 
group authentication in order to authenticate each other.  
 
The security analysis of the proposed TCGA framework is 
given below. Security analysis shows that proposed TCGA 
framework is flexible which realizes many-to-many 
authentication and secure in distributed environment.  
 
IV. Results and Discussion 
TCGA scheme is implemented for WI-FI using laptop 
devices. All the devices communicate with each other with 
respect to their individual group. Implementation results are 
discussed below. 
 
• Implementation Results: 
 
Working of TCGA shows that, generating session secret, 
encryption, and hashing take place at GA. In this paper, 
TCGA scheme is compared with the group authentication 
scheme presented in [9] in terms of the number of handshake 
between GA, and device to device. Number of handshakes 
between communicating entities and the computation at the 
respective entity is directly related to the computational 
overhead of the authentication scheme. In the TCGA scheme, 
the number of handshakes between devices, and GA are three 
which include request for the session secret, sending a reply to 
the device comprising of (SS, Kpu (G), H [SS], and finally the 
reply from device which includes either successful 
authentication, or failure. In the scheme presented in [9], the 
number of handshakes between GA, and communicating 
entity (user) are four which includes all user registration, 
sending private token to each user, GA assisted group 
authentication, and the result of authentication to GA. In 
TCGA scheme, three types of computation takes place at GA 
which includes generation of session secret, encryption, and 
hash creation.  
 
In [9], computations takes place at GA includes selecting 
random polynomial of degree t-1, computing n tokens, token 
distribution to all group members, and the selection of secret. 
Hence, there are four different types of computation taking 
place at GA in this case. Table I shows the comparison of 
TCGA scheme with the scheme proposed in [9] for different 
comparative parameters.  
 
The proposed TCGA scheme is implemented for WI-FI 
devices using laptop devices of the same configuration in 
order to compare the computational time. Computational time 
is measured at GA for authenticating one device, and the 
average of three measurements is taken to avoid the variation 
caused by environmental parameters. Result shows that TCGA 
scheme takes 0.496 seconds at GA, and GAS [9] takes 0.681 
seconds. This difference in the computational time at GA to 
authenticate one device shows that TCGA is energy efficient 
as compared to the GAS. This makes TCGA lightweight, and 
it helps to alleviate battery exhaustion attack.  
 
 
TABLE I: COMPARISON BETWEEN TCGA AND GAS [9] 
Parameters        Scheme  TCGA  GAS [9] 
Number of Handshake (GA and 
Device) 
03 04 
Number of computations at GA 03 04 
Computational time at GA 0.496 s 0.681s 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of Devices Vs Group Authentication Time 
 
A series of three measurements have been taken to find the 
group authentication time in seconds by increasing the number 
of devices from two to ten. Figure 4 shows that, with the 
increase in the number of devices, there is no significant 
change in the authentication time. This result shows that, even 
the numbers of devices are increased at a faster rate; there is 
no increase in the authentication time at the same rate. This 
shows that TCGA scheme is scalable, and best suited for IoT 
consisting of unbound number of devices.  
 
 
Figure 5: TCGA Vs GAS  
 
The proposed TCGA scheme is also compared with GAS 
scheme in terms of the computational time required for 
authenticating devices. The number of devices varies from two 
to ten, and authentication time in seconds in measured for both 
TCGA and GAS. Figure 5 shows that, TCGA scheme 
performs better than GAS scheme. Results shown in the 
Figure 4, and 5 shows that the proposed TCGA scheme 
performs better in terms of the number of handshake, 
computations at GA as well as the time required to 
authenticate varied number of devices.  
 
 
 
• Security Analysis 
 
The proposed TCGA scheme is also analyzed for the 
replay attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. The analysis is as 
follows: 
i. Replay Attack 
Replay attack is one in which a valid data transmission 
between two devices is intercepted, and is reused with 
malicious intent. Let's consider the scenario in which an 
attacker M possessing the symmetric key tries to communicate 
with a third person belonging to the same group in subsequent 
sessions. This will not be possible as the session key is 
dynamically changed as each new group activity is initiated. 
 
ii. Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
A man-in-the-middle attack is a one in which an attacker 
M makes an independent connection with the victims A, and 
B, making them believe that they are communicating with 
each other. The attacker M intercepts the message coming 
from A to B, and B to A, and re-routes them. In our proposed 
scheme, the session key is established between the members 
of the group participating in the group activity. Any 
communication between the group members is secured by 
using symmetric key encryption using this session key. Hence, 
the attacker M cannot decrypt the messages between A, and B, 
and misuse the information sent between the legitimate 
devices. 
 
V. Conclusions and Future Work 
In the IoT, there are unbounded numbers of heterogeneous 
devices talking to each other. Each device should not be able 
to authenticate during the short time. Due to the scale of 
economics, more than hundreds of devices may request 
authentication approval at the same time. To this purpose, this 
paper has presented TCGA which is Threshold Cryptography-
based lightweight, scalable, and secures the Group 
Authentication scheme. This scheme not only established a 
group authentication scheme which ensures the simultaneous 
authentication of all the members of a group using Paillier 
Threshold Cryptography but also established a secret session 
key which can be used for communication that might occur in 
group oriented applications.  The Implementation results have 
been measured for computational time and authentication 
time, and also compared with the existing work. Results shows 
that, proposed TCGA scheme is lightweight and scalable, and 
alleviates the effect of battery exhaustion attack. Security 
analysis of TCGA is also presented in this paper which shows 
that, TCGA is resistant to replay, and man-in-the-middle 
attack. 
The future plan is to integrate TCGA scheme with the IdM 
framework presented in [16]. Implementation of TCGA for 
wireless sensor network, and RFID is also another good 
research area to continue.  
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